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FOREWORD: TRAVELS FAR AND WIDE'
LINDA R. HIRSHMAN*
When John F. Kennedy held a dinner for the American Nobel lau-
reates at the White House, he called it the most illustrious gathering in
that spot since Jefferson dined alone. 2 In the uncharted waters where
classical philosophy, history, and law meet, the same might be said of our
Symposium. Our participants include Gordon Wood, Professor and His-
tory Department Chair, Brown University, and author of The Creation of
the American Republic 3 -a man who might fairly be called the godfather
of the republican revival; William Galston, Professor, School of Public
Affairs and Senior Research Scholar, Institute on Philosophy and Public
Policy, University of Maryland, and author of an important body of
work on liberal virtues, including Justice and the Human Good 4 and the
forthcoming Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues & Diversity in the Liberal
State; Ronald S. Beiner, Professor, Department of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Toronto, and author of the influential Political Judgment;5
Lawrence Solum, Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, and au-
thor of a growing body of work mining Aristotelian insights within the
legal tradition, including The Vices and Virtues of a Judge. An Aristote-
lian Guide to Judicial Selection;6 Thomas Pangle, Professor, Department
of Political Science, University of Toronto, and author recently of The
Spirit of Modern Republicanism;7 Cass Sunstein, Karl N. Llewellyn Pro-
fessor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School, author of
dozens of articles and the recent After the Rights Revolution," and one of
the two or three founders of the republican revival in legal scholarship;
all of whom are commented on with enormous grace and learning by
Martha Nussbaum, University Professor and Professor of Philosophy
and Classics, Brown University, and author, inter alia, of The Fragility of
* Professor of Law and Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar, lIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law.
1. HOMER, ODYSSEY, BOOK I ("Tell me, 0 Muse of that ingenious hero who travelled far and
wide after he had sacked the famous town of Troy.").
2. See, inter alia, The First Jeffersonian, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1990, § 7, at 11, col. 1.
3. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1972).
4. W. GALSTON, JUSTICE AND THE HUMAN GOOD (1980).
5. R. BEINER, POLITICAL JUDGMENT (1983).
6. 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1988).
7. T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM (1988).
8. C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990).
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Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy.9
So, if any group could produce a unified field theory of the contem-
porary American order and classical philosophy, this was it. Not sur-
prisingly, no such consensus did emerge. However, the participants did
agree in some interesting and revealing ways on what the issues, if not
what the resolutions, were. And the issues our symposium participants
saw in the inquiry were: exclusivity and inclusiveness, natural virtue and
individual dignity, common good and individual autonomy, elitism and
egalitarianism. Put another way, they saw the issues of antiquity and
modernity. Now a number of participants, indeed, most participants,
sought to find some common ground. After all, if classical philosophy is
forever lost on the other side of a fault line drawn roughly through the
Peace of Westphalia, 10 the participants wouldn't have much to discuss.
Given the common thread of conflict (or at least inconsistency) be-
tween the two subjects of the Symposium, it might be interesting to con-
sider the contributions from the standpoint of reconciliationism. I think
it is fair to say that Wood and Galston are the pessimists on the applica-
tion of classical philosophy to modern American law and life, with vary-
ing types and degrees of regret. Sunstein and Nussbaum are the
optimists, with varying degrees and types of caution. Pangle's formula-
tion of a tradition in great tension between the republican and modernist
strains, Beiner's attack on modern liberalism's strong defenses against
classical thought, and Solum's reworking of civic virtue as communica-
tive rationality occupy a kind of middle ground on the reconciliation
map.
In addition to illuminating the distances between the traditions,
Wood's and Galston's exchange serves to sketch in, at least, the outline
of American modernism, against which all proposals for revision must be
measured. It seems peculiar to classify the "godfather" of the republican
revival as pessimistic about the relevance of classicism to American his-
tory, yet two aspects of Classical Republicanism and the American
Revolution " make this conclusion unavoidable. One, Gordon Wood's
pathbreaking work has been and continues to be focussed on the republi-
canism that evolved through centuries since antiquity, an evolution that
greatly changed in shape and form by the time of the American experi-
9. M. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY
AND PHILOSOPHY (1986).
10. See, inter alia, Perry, A Critique of the "Liberal" Political-Philosophical Project, 28 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 205, 211 (1987). The roots of liberal neutrality are often traced to the unresolvable
conflicts that produced the wars of religion.
11. Wood, Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13
(1990).
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ence.12 Gordon Wood is, after all, an historian of the eighteenth century,
and it is the eighteenth century species of republicanism that he invokes.
As his paper demonstrates, the affective republicanism following the En-
lightenment, in which love and benevolence are substituted for more mil-
itaristic traits characteristic of the ancient republics, is quite a change
from antiquity. But eighteenth century republicanism still remains
linked to antiquity, as Wood reflects, in its critique of commercialism, its
emphasis on self-governance, and its sacrifice of private interests for the
community. 13 Wood's place at the remote end of the reconciliation line
rests most firmly on a second aspect of his work-that is, his unambigu-
ous assertion of the demise of republicanism after the American revolu-
tion and its replacement by the "unruly" American republic 14 where
even public office, that most sacred of republican cows, was for sale. If
republicanism remains an influence in America after this sea change,
Wood concludes, it is only in our occasional longings for moderation in
the quest for wealth, for country life, and for military types as selfless
leaders. 15
Both in commenting on Wood and in The Use and Abuse of the
Classics in American Constitutionalism, William Galston describes an
even wider gulf. At the critical period, he contends, the Federalist Pa-
pers rejected Greek practice and theory as warlike, unstable, and incon-
sistent with prosperity.16 Although Galston recognizes that the
Founders were poised between republicanism, particularly as manifest in
their own virtue, and modernity, in the form of egalitarianism and the
attendant factionalism they feared, he, like Wood, concludes that the
fragile balance tipped to modernity during the period after the Found-
ing. 17 Galston's singular contribution to the debate, parallelling his over-
all body of work, is to assert the relevance of a structural, rather than a
literal, appeal to the classics. Such an appeal, in the case of contempo-
rary American political philosophy, would take the form of articulating
the virtues contextual to the regime we have-the regime of egalitarian
democracy. 18 But to me the most striking of Galston's insights is not the
positive charge, but the forthright description of the loss to egalitarian
12. Id. at 19.
13. Id. at 23.
14. Id. at 36.
15. Id. at 37.
16. Galston, The Use and Abuse of the Classics in American Constitutionalism, 66 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 47, 49 (1990).
17. Id. at 59.
18. Id. at 65.
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democracy of the political gentleman, 19 who, although bearing unequal
gifts, cannot assert a preemptive claim to rule.20
As the contributors come closer to reconciliationism, the strains be-
tween the traditions are revealed in greater relief. Thus, at the center of
Beiner's and Pangle's papers is a deeply felt expression of how the aban-
donment of classical ideals has impoverished the modem experience. Of
the two, in The Challenge Classical Political Philosophy Poses to the
American Constitution, Pangle probably comes closer to the pessimists of
the Galston/Wood school. After sketching out a narrative of the evolu-
tion of political philosophy from republicanism to what he calls the
"rights" tradition,21 Pangle presents the American founding as a tense
interaction among the theocratic tradition of the Bible, classical republi-
can tradition rooted in classical political philosophy, and modem liberal
rationalism. 22  Pangle asserts that the American "Republicanism of
rights" 23 combines two volatile and often inconsistent commitments: to
rights and to self-government. The problem with this mixture, he con-
cludes, is that it combines both an ever-increasing trajectory of individu-
alism and the power and responsibility of common governance, while the
Founders' wellsprings of public virtue-classical republicanism and
Protestant Christianity-are a dwindling resource in modem times.
I interpret Ronald Beiner's The Liberal Regime as more optimistic
regarding the relevance of classical philosophy to the modem order. He
does not balk at applying substantive classical insights to criticize the
modem liberal regime. Of the several extremely interesting criticisms
Beiner makes, surely the richest and most interesting is his insistence on
the existence in any regime of the ethos-that creation of moral life based
on character formation according to socially bred customs and habit-
and his refusal to accept the liberal claim to a neutral ethos. Instead, he
describes a liberal ethos of exaltation of the individual, with an unac-
knowledged but powerful hierarchy of privileged and depreciated roles.
Most importantly, he highlights the seriously negative side effect of liber-
19. "Gentleman" is Galston's locution, which is as it should be, because he's talking about
ancient categories, which are lost. For the question of whether the aspiration of the best to rule must
be limited to the male norm, see Hirshman, The Book of A (Aristotelianism as structural feminism)
- TEX. L. REV. - (1992) (forthcoming).
20. Galston, supra note 16, at 59-61.
21. The broad history of political philosophy which introduces Pangle's essay is generally at-
tributable to Leo Strauss, directly, and through his first generation of disciples. See HISTORY OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY passim (L. Strauss & J. Cropsey eds. 1987); and especially, Strauss, Niccolo
Machiavelli, id. at 296-318; and Pangle & Tarcov, Epilogue, id. at 907.
22. Pangle, The Classical Challenge to the American Constitution, 66 CH.-KENT L. REV. 145,
148 (1990).
23. Id. at 161.
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alism's purported neutrality-that it stifles theory as a vehicle to criticize
the dominant way of life.24
Criticizing Pangle and Beiner and in their own essays, Cass Sun-
stein, and to a much lesser extent Lawrence Solum, avert their eyes from
the harshest vision of the distance between classical philosophy and mo-
dernity. Instead, and this is perhaps the most interesting distinction be-
tween their contributions and the rest, they pretty much assume that
they can pursue and articulate, even if piecemeal, what Beiner calls a
"synthetic position": liberal republicanism. 25
Sunstein reminds Pangle of the consistency between democratic self-
government and certain rights, like free speech and assembly, that he
considers "logical counterparts" 26 to the enterprise. In his main piece,
Sunstein asserts affirmatively that a liberal community might selectively
breach the assumption of the immunity of private preferences and subject
those preferences to the collective device of democratic decisionmaking
without sacrificing all that is good in liberalism. And he selects several
candidates for this process, including the market monism of broadcast
communications and the political monism of unitary districts of
representation.
Solum, too, explores the ways in which classical philosophy, as re-
flected in civic republicanism, can function as "a live theory of how our
political order ought to be constituted. ' 27 (Unlike Sunstein, he explicitly
foregoes any argument resting on the actual role of classical philosophy
in the founding.) Solum sees two possibilities. One is for the revival of a
live concept of Aristotelian civic virtue for the project of self-governance.
The other is the inclusion of formerly excluded voices-women, people
of color, or people of alternative sexual preferences-in the project of
self-government, in the interest of communicative rationality. 28 Not sur-
prisingly, Pangle, criticizing Sunstein, and Beiner on Solum see the same
failing, that is, a too easy reconciliationism.
But the most heroic effort at reconciliationism has to be Martha
Nussbaum's Comments. Interestingly, although she is the source of one
of the most provocative revisions of Aristotle's political virtue,29 in this
instance she first chooses to remind the reader of the importance, partic-
ularly to the founders, of another strand of the classical tradition-the
24. Beiner, The Liberal Regime, 66 CHI.-KEr L. REV. 73, 84 (1990).
25. Beiner, Comment on Solum, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 141, 142 (1990).
26. Sunstein, Comment on Pangle, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 179 (1990).
27. Solum, Virtues and Voices, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 111 (1990).
28. This is explicitly from Habermas. Id. at 123.
29. Nussbaum, Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato, in Es-
SAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS (A.O. Rorty ed. 1980).
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stoics, to whom she attributes the assumption of the universal capacity
for virtue quite consistent with liberal democracy.30 But she also finds
support for this stoic conception in Aristotle, whose writings she presents
as painting an unconventional picture of the general availability of the
virtue Aristotle felt was necessary to live a full human life. Finally, she
reminds the reader that the classical conception of the passions as com-
plex social products subject to the agencies of socialization like education
is similarly consistent with the inclusive version of civic virtue.
In her summation after hearing all of the presentations, Professor
Nussbaum finds much to agree with, particularly in the work of the other
reconciliationists, Solum and Sunstein. But the most interesting aspect
of the commentary is her disagreement, consistent with her reconcilia-
tionism, with Pangle and Beiner-Pangle for overstating the harshness of
the classical tradition and Beiner for overstating the impoverishment of
the modem.
I think it is no coincidence that the recent literature of legal scholar-
ship has been replete with evidence that lawyers, impatient types that we
are, are not going to wait for resolution of these global problems before
attempting to bring to bear in the modem American society in which we
live the reconciliation that was the subject of the participants' debate.
The application of the insights of antiquity--of common purpose and
common good, of natural politics and classical virtue-are once again the
currency of concrete interpretations and proposals, even if the writers are
unaware of their hoary antecedents. Perhaps this symposium will alert
these unconscious contemporary classicists as well.
In this Foreword, I wish to call the reader's attention to three of
these works: one statutory, one constitutional, and one directed to the
behavior of the profession itself. The statutory work focuses, in retro-
spect predictably, on what was always the political development most
threatening to modem liberal pluralism in the United States: the labor
movement. In a remarkable series of works, Katherine Van Wezel Stone
has been retelling the story of late twentieth century labor law as a liberal
regime's fundamentally mistaken choice of industrial pluralism over the
competing paradigm of participation in a public community of produc-
tion.31 Although Stone does not articulate the whole vision in any one
30. Nussbaum, Comments, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 213, 219 (1990).
31. Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Uneasy Relationship Between Individual
Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining Systems (on file with Chicago-Kent Law
Review); Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway Labor Act in the Era of Deregulation, 42
STAN. L. REv. 1485 (1990) [hereinafter Labor Relations]; Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure:
Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 73 (1988).
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place, the foundational mistakes are poignantly reflective of the debate in
the Symposium. First, in a series of decisions establishing the role and
enforcement of the labor agreement by private arbitrators, the world of
labor relations was separated from the larger public world of the commu-
nity-privatized, if you will. Next, the relations were constructed as a
Hobbesian economic war, with bargaining basically dependent on eco-
nomic pressure rather than legal regulation. Finally, the business enter-
prise was fragmented into spheres of decisionmaking, with little
consideration of the common enterprise. In a genuinely new take, Stone
unfavorably contrasts this regime of industrial labor relations with the
much-maligned system of railway labor, characterized by stable condi-
tions of employment and publicly-enforced, prolonged bargaining over a
wide range of issues.32 The parallels with the Symposium are striking.
Like Galston and Wood, Stone's description of the penetration of liberal
assumptions into the regulation of industrial labor relations reflects
graphically the power and hegemony of the liberal paradigm. Like
Beiner, her work details its costs. But most importantly, like Sunstein,
she finds room, if one is open-minded enough to the possibilities, for
richer visions of the common good within American life and tradition of
political freedom.
The second example, one directed to the behavior of the legal profes-
sion, comes from the work of legal ethicist Thomas Shaffer, a work tenta-
tiyely titled Lawyers and Their Communities.3 3 Shaffer takes up both of
the core concerns of classical philosophy: the nature and value of com-
munity, and the virtues of a human life and their relationship to commu-
nity. In his vision of community, he rejects both the American liberal
vision and its attempted modification by invocation of republican values.
The one, he argues, has as its most benign type the " 'ethical accord be-
tween individuals well disposed to one another' "; but "'the more likely
community is an arrangement based on mutual agreement or conven-
ience.' 34 The "republican vision," he continues, while "more attrac-
tive" is "no more persuasive." 35 His argument against American
republicanism seems to rest largely on its toleration of slavery and sex
discrimination during the period of aristocratic hegemony. He concludes
32. Stone, Labor Relations, supra note 31.
33. See Shaffer & Shaffer, Character and Community: Rispetto As a Virtue in the Tradition of
Italian-American Lawyers, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 838 n.3 (1989) [hereinafter Rispetto]. The
project also includes Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Belonging, 49 OHIo ST. L.J. 703 (1988) and Shaffer,
Lawyers as Assimilators and Preservers, 58 Miss. L.J. 405 (1988).
34. Shaffer, Rispetto, supra note 33, at 880 (quoting Powell, Persons in God (1988) (un-
published)).
35. Id. at 881.
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that "the republican aspiration never counted for as much in the Ameri-
can conscience as prosperity, imperialism, and regional economy" 36 and
was meaningless by the time significant non-English immigrants arrived.
Shaffer's preferred examples of community are " 'mediating associa-
tions' that justify describing themselves with family metaphors and that
can stand between the person and the jurisdictions in which law and the
accidents of geography place him."' 37 His communities have value be-
cause they are the institutions within which people make moral deci-
sions, which are, according to his vision, less acts of choice than acts of
coming home. In his most recent project (with Mary Shaffer, who is not
a lawyer), he examines a moral value called "rispetto." Rispetto, a prod-
uct of Italian-American legal ethics, functions to mediate between the
assimilationist claims of the professional community and the individual
and family history of parochialism. Like classical virtue, rispetto is a
habit of character, including a sense of place, independence, courage,
self-respect, and respect for the space of the outsider. 38 Like the classical
virtues, the virtue emerges from a particular community at a particular
place and time, with strong homogeneity and a common experience of
moderate scarcity. Thus, like our Symposium refuseniks Galston and
Wood, Shaffer doubts whether modem American life can support a class-
ical vision of community. Shaffer's solution is both a compromise-to
think smaller, preferring communities to community-and a most ambi-
tious reconciliationist project, adding the quest for substantive virtue
within small communities to the aspiration for community simple.
Finally, Susan Bandes has recently gathered together the growing
tide of arguments criticizing the central tenet of American legalism, the
negative constitution.39 The concept of the Constitution as imposing
only negative obligations on government has deep roots, resting on a
well-established reading of constitutional text and original intent as well
as on a current understanding of the common-law background.4° And it
has powerful contemporary support, based on assertions of institutional
capabilities and the fear of the slippery slope into totalitarianism. 4'
Against this modem world view, Bandes asks questions clearly
36. Id.
37. Id. at 883.
38. Id. at 845, paraphrasing Francis Femminella, The Ethnic Ideological Themes of Italian
Americans, in THE FAMILY AND COMMUNITY LIFE OF ITALIAN AMERICANS 115-16 (R.N. Juliani
ed. 1983).
39. Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990).
40. Id. at 2308-18. Bandes' report of the contemporary retelling of the common law may be
correct, but it is far from the only reading of that material. See Heyman, The First Duty of Govern.
ment: Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth Amendment, - DUKE L. J. - (1992) (forthcoming).
41. Bandes, supra note 39, at 2326-42.
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linked to the debate over classical philosophy and American constitu-
tionalism. First, she reviews positivist assumptions of originalism, which
support the interpretive model of the negative constitution. The consti-
tutional enterprise, Bandes reminds us, could be, and for large portions
of American history has been, quite a flexible one, with many possibilities
not clearly contemplated in 1787. Next, she invokes the important new
insights of recent constitutional scholars from the civic republican move-
ment. These scholars, including Symposium participant Cass Sunstein,
have bade us to remember that any baselines against which government
action or inaction is measured are themselves the result of conscious
value-laden choices. Finally, and most importantly, she invokes the very
classical insight that negative liberty is not a state of nature, but a relin-
quishment of all the possibilities of collective, governmental action to es-
tablish and maintain a different social order.42 The question at hand,
Bandes concludes, is not the negative/positive or penalty/subsidy debate
of the current Supreme Court, but a much more elevated one: "[W]hat
must we have in order to be free?" 43
Labor unions, Italian-American lawyers, constitutional baselines.
Communities of production, communities of history, communities of citi-
zenship. In the world of contemporary legal theory, the American lib-
eral consensus is breaking up, and a new odyssey is under way. Our
Symposium addresses the relationship between classical philosophy and
the American constitutional order. What better place to start the jour-
ney than from the original port?
42. Id. at 2342- 47.
43. Id. at 2347.
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